Ensure fs changes in response processor are within app dir (#496)

This commit is contained in:
Will Chen
2025-06-25 16:13:10 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent 2ea9500f73
commit a985a5aadf
3 changed files with 294 additions and 6 deletions

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import fs from "node:fs";
import { getDyadAppPath } from "../../paths/paths";
import path from "node:path";
import git from "isomorphic-git";
import { safeJoin } from "../utils/path_utils";
import log from "electron-log";
import { executeAddDependency } from "./executeAddDependency";
@@ -296,11 +297,11 @@ export async function processFullResponseActions(
}
writtenFiles.push("package.json");
const pnpmFilename = "pnpm-lock.yaml";
if (fs.existsSync(path.join(appPath, pnpmFilename))) {
if (fs.existsSync(safeJoin(appPath, pnpmFilename))) {
writtenFiles.push(pnpmFilename);
}
const packageLockFilename = "package-lock.json";
if (fs.existsSync(path.join(appPath, packageLockFilename))) {
if (fs.existsSync(safeJoin(appPath, packageLockFilename))) {
writtenFiles.push(packageLockFilename);
}
}
@@ -319,7 +320,7 @@ export async function processFullResponseActions(
// Process all file deletions
for (const filePath of dyadDeletePaths) {
const fullFilePath = path.join(appPath, filePath);
const fullFilePath = safeJoin(appPath, filePath);
// Delete the file if it exists
if (fs.existsSync(fullFilePath)) {
@@ -362,8 +363,8 @@ export async function processFullResponseActions(
// Process all file renames
for (const tag of dyadRenameTags) {
const fromPath = path.join(appPath, tag.from);
const toPath = path.join(appPath, tag.to);
const fromPath = safeJoin(appPath, tag.from);
const toPath = safeJoin(appPath, tag.to);
// Ensure target directory exists
const dirPath = path.dirname(toPath);
@@ -427,7 +428,7 @@ export async function processFullResponseActions(
for (const tag of dyadWriteTags) {
const filePath = tag.path;
const content = tag.content;
const fullFilePath = path.join(appPath, filePath);
const fullFilePath = safeJoin(appPath, filePath);
// Ensure directory exists
const dirPath = path.dirname(fullFilePath);

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
import path from "node:path";
/**
* Safely joins paths while ensuring the result stays within the base directory.
* This prevents directory traversal attacks where malicious paths like "../../etc/passwd"
* could be used to access files outside the intended directory.
*
* @param basePath The base directory that should contain the result
* @param ...paths Path segments to join with the base path
* @returns The joined path if it's within the base directory
* @throws Error if the resulting path would be outside the base directory
*/
export function safeJoin(basePath: string, ...paths: string[]): string {
// Check if any of the path segments are absolute paths (which would be unsafe)
for (const pathSegment of paths) {
if (path.isAbsolute(pathSegment)) {
throw new Error(
`Unsafe path: joining "${paths.join(", ")}" with base "${basePath}" would escape the base directory`,
);
}
// Also check for home directory shortcuts which are effectively absolute
if (pathSegment.startsWith("~/")) {
throw new Error(
`Unsafe path: joining "${paths.join(", ")}" with base "${basePath}" would escape the base directory`,
);
}
// Check for Windows-style absolute paths (C:\, D:\, etc.)
if (/^[A-Za-z]:[/\\]/.test(pathSegment)) {
throw new Error(
`Unsafe path: joining "${paths.join(", ")}" with base "${basePath}" would escape the base directory`,
);
}
// Check for UNC paths (\\server\share)
if (pathSegment.startsWith("\\\\")) {
throw new Error(
`Unsafe path: joining "${paths.join(", ")}" with base "${basePath}" would escape the base directory`,
);
}
}
// Join all the paths
const joinedPath = path.join(basePath, ...paths);
// Resolve both paths to absolute paths to handle any ".." components
const resolvedBasePath = path.resolve(basePath);
const resolvedJoinedPath = path.resolve(joinedPath);
// Check if the resolved joined path starts with the base path
// Use path.relative to ensure we're doing a proper path comparison
const relativePath = path.relative(resolvedBasePath, resolvedJoinedPath);
// If relativePath starts with ".." or is absolute, then resolvedJoinedPath is outside basePath
if (relativePath.startsWith("..") || path.isAbsolute(relativePath)) {
throw new Error(
`Unsafe path: joining "${paths.join(", ")}" with base "${basePath}" would escape the base directory`,
);
}
return joinedPath;
}