Files

Macky 3d5c81fbd7 feat(saas): Phase 3 — plan/seats/active model, ToS consent, signed expiring export

P3a: org carries plan/seats/active/created_at; create_user enforces seats + rejects
inactive org; verify blocks login for inactive orgs; PATCH /api/admin/orgs (super_admin)
updates plan/seats/active with audit. Fixed verify swallowing its AuthError.
P3b: export/token issues a 5-min HMAC one-time CSV link; export accepts ?token=.
P3c: setup requires accepted_terms (consent stored); Setup.vue consent checkbox.
All 8 backend suites pass. Rebuilt dist.

2026-08-09 09:48:55 +07:00

3.1 KiB

Raw Blame History

SaaS / Multi-tenant Plan — Sales Trainer

Product is being sold as SaaS. The current code is a single-app (filesystem JSON) with a latent org_id on users/groups but WITHOUT true per-org isolation at every boundary. This plan turns it into a real multi-tenant SaaS + product hardening, in phases.

Current state (verified)

org_id exists on: users (users.py:30,78), groups (groups.py:33), created at bootstrap as org-default (factory.py:19).
Org scoping present in: _get_owned_group / _get_ready_group (group_routes/chat_routes), list_for_org / list_visible_to (groups.py), list_users(org_id=...) (users.py), admin/me/analytics routes filter by actor.org_id.
BUT: many endpoints rely on super_admin global bypass and there is no explicit per-org tenant guard at the JWT/request layer. Sessions, uploads, own_persona are keyed by user_id (adequate) but should verify group's org matches the actor.

Phase 1 — Enforce tenant isolation (multi-tenant correctness) ✅ DONE

Tenant context on auth: g.org_id set in require_auth. ✅
Single choke-point guard: assert_tenant() + current_org_id() in helpers; existing _authorize_group org check kept. super_admin is global; admins org-scoped. ✅
Multi-org create: POST /api/admin/users {new_org:true} (super_admin) creates a new org + its first admin; GET /api/admin/orgs platform view (super_admin sees all, admin sees own). Fixed create_org double-id bug. ✅
Regression test test_saas_tenant.py: org2 admin blocked (403) from org1 group, can't list org1 group/users, sees only own org; super_admin sees all. ✅

Phase 2 — Product hardening (provenance, abuse, secrets) ✅ DONE

Rate limiting per-user-IP and per-username on login; per-user on chat send (protects LLM cost). New services/rate_limit.py (in-memory + disk, no deps). ✅
Audit log data/audit/audit.jsonl on org.create, user.promote_super_admin, analytics.export. ✅
CSV export org-scoped — admin exports only own org's sessions. ✅

Phase 3 — SaaS-launch readiness ✅ DONE

Account/plan model: org has plan (trial/paid/enterprise), seats, active, created_at. create_user enforces seats + active; verify blocks login for inactive orgs. PATCH /api/admin/orgs/<id> (super_admin) sets plan/seats/active + audit.
ToS/consent: setup now requires accepted_terms (stored as accepted_terms_at); Setup.vue shows a ToS/Privacy consent checkbox (links /legal stub). ✅
Signed expiring export link: /api/analytics/export/token issues a 5-min HMAC signed one-time link; /api/analytics/export?token= accepts it (Bearer JWT still works). Seats/active enforced on user creation. ✅
Persona "recipe" server-side obfuscation: interim since strip (Phase 1); full move of internal logic server-side remains a longer-term item (out of v1 launch).

Out of scope for now

Real billing/payments, separate storage volumes per tenant, horizontal scale.

Status flags next to each phase item updated as work completes.

3.1 KiB Raw Blame History