Elevate MiroFish/CrowdSight from single-container dev to a SaaS foundation: - Local memory backend (Zep-compatible): memory services/models, local graph builder + updater, AgentActivity seam, import-boundary isolation; Zep stays default, local is opt-in behind MEMORY_BACKEND. Semantic parity not yet proven. - Durable product persistence: projects/simulations/reports schema (migration 0007) + tenant/owner-scoped ProductRepository + dual-write + scoped_project read-first + ArtifactStore abstraction; durable JobQueue + worker.py. - SaaS hardening: durable RateLimiter (wired to login), UsageService (LLM accounting), redacted AuditService, idempotency, CORS allowlist, safe API errors, single-use PasswordResetService + endpoints (covers invite-pending). - Exactly 3 roles (super_admin/admin/user) with tenant authz policy. - Admin UI: GET/POST/PATCH /api/admin/users + GET/PUT /api/admin/settings (super-admin only, encrypted/masked); AdminView.vue + SettingsView.vue with admin/super-admin route guards, th/en i18n. - Production deploy topology: multi-stage Dockerfile (frontend build + gunicorn wsgi + nginx SPA-proxy + supervisord worker), backend/wsgi.py, gunicorn dep. Backend 197 passed; frontend 10 tests + build green. ruff unavailable (gap). No commit of credentials; secrets handled via env/.env.example. Deferred: Zep semantic A/B parity, object storage cutover, mobile QA, EasyPanel container build of deploy topology.
236 lines
8.2 KiB
Python
236 lines
8.2 KiB
Python
import json
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from flask import Flask
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from sqlalchemy import create_engine
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from app.api.admin import admin_bp
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from app.api.auth import auth_bp
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from app.db import Base, create_session_factory
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from app.services.identity import IdentityRepository, PasswordService
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def make_admin_app():
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engine = create_engine("sqlite+pysqlite:///:memory:")
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Base.metadata.create_all(engine)
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session_factory = create_session_factory(engine)
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app = Flask(__name__)
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app.config.update(TESTING=True, SECRET_KEY="test-secret", SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=False)
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app.extensions["crowdsight_session_factory"] = session_factory
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app.register_blueprint(auth_bp, url_prefix="/api/auth")
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app.register_blueprint(admin_bp, url_prefix="/api/admin")
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with session_factory() as session:
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repo = IdentityRepository(session)
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org = repo.create_organization(name="Org A", slug="org-a")
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admin = repo.create_user(
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email="admin@example.com",
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password_hash=PasswordService.hash_password("correct horse battery staple"),
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)
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repo.create_membership(admin.id, org.id, "admin")
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user = repo.create_user(
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email="user@example.com",
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password_hash=PasswordService.hash_password("correct horse battery staple"),
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)
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repo.create_membership(user.id, org.id, "user")
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session.commit()
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return app, engine
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def login(client, email):
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response = client.post(
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"/api/auth/login",
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json={"email": email, "password": "correct horse battery staple"},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 200
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def _csrf_headers(client):
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return {"X-CSRF-Token": client.get_cookie("crowdsight_csrf").value}
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def test_admin_lists_and_creates_users_only_in_current_organization():
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app, engine = make_admin_app()
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try:
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client = app.test_client()
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login(client, "admin@example.com")
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listed = client.get("/api/admin/users")
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assert listed.status_code == 200
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body = listed.get_json()
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assert body["data"]["count"] == 2
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assert all("password_hash" not in user for user in body["data"]["users"])
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created = client.post(
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"/api/admin/users",
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json={"email": "new-user@example.com"},
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headers=_csrf_headers(client),
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)
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assert created.status_code == 201
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assert created.get_json()["data"]["role"] == "user"
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finally:
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engine.dispose()
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def test_admin_cannot_grant_admin_and_user_cannot_manage_users():
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app, engine = make_admin_app()
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try:
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admin_client = app.test_client()
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login(admin_client, "admin@example.com")
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forbidden = admin_client.post(
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"/api/admin/users",
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json={"email": "new-admin@example.com", "role": "admin"},
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headers=_csrf_headers(admin_client),
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)
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assert forbidden.status_code == 403
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assert forbidden.get_json()["error_code"] == "admin_role_grant_forbidden"
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user_client = app.test_client()
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login(user_client, "user@example.com")
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user_forbidden = user_client.get("/api/admin/users")
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assert user_forbidden.status_code == 403
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finally:
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engine.dispose()
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def test_admin_duplicate_email_returns_conflict_without_db_error():
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app, engine = make_admin_app()
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try:
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client = app.test_client()
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login(client, "admin@example.com")
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response = client.post(
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"/api/admin/users",
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json={"email": "user@example.com"},
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headers=_csrf_headers(client),
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)
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assert response.status_code == 409
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assert response.get_json()["error_code"] == "user_exists"
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finally:
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engine.dispose()
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def test_state_changing_admin_request_requires_csrf_token():
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app, engine = make_admin_app()
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try:
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client = app.test_client()
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login(client, "admin@example.com")
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response = client.post(
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"/api/admin/users",
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json={"email": "csrf-user@example.com"},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 403
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assert response.get_json()["error_code"] == "csrf_failed"
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finally:
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engine.dispose()
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def test_admin_can_update_user_role_within_allowed_domain():
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app, engine = make_admin_app()
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try:
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client = app.test_client()
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login(client, "admin@example.com")
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# Find the target user's id.
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listed = client.get("/api/admin/users").get_json()
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target = next(u for u in listed["data"]["users"] if u["email"] == "user@example.com")
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# Admin may manage a USER role only (policy: user→user is allowed).
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response = client.patch(
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f"/api/admin/users/{target['id']}",
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json={"role": "user"},
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headers=_csrf_headers(client),
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)
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assert response.status_code == 200
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assert response.get_json()["data"]["role"] == "user"
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finally:
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engine.dispose()
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def test_admin_cannot_promote_to_super_admin():
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app, engine = make_admin_app()
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try:
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client = app.test_client()
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login(client, "admin@example.com")
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listed = client.get("/api/admin/users").get_json()
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target = next(u for u in listed["data"]["users"] if u["email"] == "user@example.com")
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response = client.patch(
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f"/api/admin/users/{target['id']}",
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json={"role": "super_admin"},
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headers=_csrf_headers(client),
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)
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assert response.status_code == 403
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assert response.get_json()["error_code"] == "admin_role_grant_forbidden"
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finally:
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engine.dispose()
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def test_settings_endpoint_requires_super_admin():
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app, engine = make_admin_app()
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try:
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client = app.test_client()
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login(client, "admin@example.com")
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# An org admin (ADMIN) must NOT be able to read or mutate platform settings.
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forbidden_get = client.get("/api/admin/settings")
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assert forbidden_get.status_code == 403
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forbidden_put = client.put(
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"/api/admin/settings",
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json={"provider": "openai", "model": "gpt-4o"},
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headers=_csrf_headers(client),
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)
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assert forbidden_put.status_code == 403
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finally:
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engine.dispose()
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def test_super_admin_can_save_and_read_settings():
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app, engine = make_admin_app()
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try:
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# SettingsService derives its Fernet key from Config.SECRET_KEY; set it
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# directly (it was evaluated from env at import time).
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from app.config import Config
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Config.SECRET_KEY = "test-encryption-secret-" * 3
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# Promote the existing admin membership to super_admin in its org.
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with app.extensions["crowdsight_session_factory"]() as session:
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from sqlalchemy import select
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from app.models.saas import Membership, Organization
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from app.services.identity import IdentityRepository
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repo = IdentityRepository(session)
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admin_user = repo.get_user_by_email("admin@example.com")
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org = session.execute(
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select(Organization).where(Organization.slug == "org-a")
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).scalar_one()
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membership = session.execute(
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select(Membership).where(
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Membership.user_id == admin_user.id,
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Membership.organization_id == org.id,
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)
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).scalar_one()
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membership.role = "super_admin"
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session.commit()
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client = app.test_client()
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login(client, "admin@example.com")
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saved = client.put(
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"/api/admin/settings",
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json={"provider": "openai", "model": "gpt-4o", "api_key": "sk-secret-value"},
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headers=_csrf_headers(client),
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)
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assert saved.status_code == 200
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data = saved.get_json()["data"]
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assert data["settings"]["model"] == "gpt-4o"
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# API key is masked (never plaintext). It may be a bare mask or a
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# masked-with-prefix variant; the important invariant is no plaintext.
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assert "sk-secret-value" not in json.dumps(saved.get_json())
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# Reading back returns masked value only; no plaintext secret leaked.
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got = client.get("/api/admin/settings")
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assert got.status_code == 200
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assert "sk-secret-value" not in json.dumps(got.get_json())
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finally:
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engine.dispose()
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