Files
microfish/docs/engineering-log.md
Kunthawat Greethong 91beb8c2dc fix: fail fast on missing/short SECRET_KEY; hide ADMIN_PASSWORD from argv
Production correct-credential login returned auth_unavailable 503 because
Flask's SECRET_KEY was unset: wrong-password probes stopped at 401 before
CSRF token issuance, while valid credentials reached _csrf_serializer()
and crashed. App factory now rejects absent/short (<32 char) SECRET_KEY at
startup, and docker_entrypoint.sh fails fast before migration/services.
Bootstrap no longer passes ADMIN_PASSWORD in process arguments; env-only.

Tests: app-factory + entrypoint regression (5 focused passed), full
backend suite 204 passed. Independent review PASS.
2026-09-01 16:28:04 +07:00

5.5 KiB

Engineering Log

Current status

Milestone Status Last verified Evidence Next action
Baseline architecture study complete 2026-08-23 npm run build passed; compileall passed; git diff --check passed; source inventory completed Review MiroFish SaaS plan and lock M0 decisions
Thai/English frontend hardening production login root cause fixed; redeploy pending 2026-09-01 Root cause of /login white screen proved with a RED vue-i18n compiler test: auth.emailPlaceholder = "name@company.com" is invalid linked-message syntax and throws compiler code 10 (Invalid linked format) while LoginView renders. Escaped as name{'@'}company.com in th/en. Recursive compiler regression covers every translation; frontend tests 11 passed, production build passed (index-B4oVHpLg.js), Chrome rendered DOM contains login-card, Thai heading, and rendered name@company.com; screenshot analysis unavailable because vision provider returned 401 Complete fresh reviewer gate, then commit/push/redeploy and verify live /login
Zep replacement bounded local E2E slice 2026-08-24 Local graph → profile → simulation config → report tools → persisted report regression passed; default remains Zep; no full consumer cutover or semantic parity claim Cut over remaining consumers and close semantic/E2E gaps
Auth/tenant/roles bounded foundation; production secret fail-fast added 2026-09-01 Identity/session/roles/CSRF/CORS/idempotency/resource guards covered; production correct-credential login 503 was proved to be missing SECRET_KEY at CSRF token issuance. App factory now rejects missing signing secret; Docker entrypoint requires a persistent key ≥32 chars. Focused tests 5 passed; backend full suite 204 passed; independent review PASS Set persistent EasyPanel SECRET_KEY + SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=true, restart, then verify correct-credential live login
SaaS foundation batch in progress 2026-08-24 Backend full suite 193 passed after app/factory isolation, SQLite-FK, auxiliary API auth/CSRF/idempotency, cross-route/multipart idempotency, local consumer-boundary fixes, durable product-resource schema/repository, tenant-scoped ArtifactStore, durable JobQueue+worker.py, versioned redacted PlatformSettings, durable RateLimiter (wired to login), durable LLM UsageService, durable redacted AuditService, and durable single-use PasswordResetService + endpoints (also covers invite-pending setup); schema/TaskManager regression 16 passed; auxiliary security 8 passed; idempotency API 5 passed; local import-boundary regression 9 fresh-import tests; product-resource persistence 21 tests; artifact store 12 tests; job queue/worker 10 tests; settings service 4 tests; rate limiter 6 tests; usage service 4 tests; audit service 3 tests; password reset 6 tests; frontend gates passed; bounded reviewers passed their exact slices; hardened bases ready; remaining: resource authz matrix completion, admin/bootstrap UI, and deploy topology; ruff unavailable; no commit/push/deploy Complete admin UI, authz matrix, then deploy topology; do not claim full-system approval
Admin/super-admin UI bounded foundation 2026-08-24 Backend: GET/POST/PATCH /api/admin/users + GET/PUT /api/admin/settings (super-admin only, masked/encrypted secret via SettingsService); Frontend: AdminView.vue (user mgmt) + SettingsView.vue (LLM settings form) routed at /admin + /admin/settings with admin/super-admin role guards, th/en i18n identical; build + 10 frontend tests pass; backend 197 passed Add invite self-setup UX, connection-test endpoint, then full i18n/mobile review
Production worker/deployment production topology drafted, locally smoke-tested 2026-08-24 Dockerfile rebuilt as multi-stage production (frontend build + python-gunicorn + nginx-SPA-proxy + supervisord worker); backend/wsgi.py gunicorn entry + gunicorn>=21 added; local smoke test: gunicorn wsgi:app started, /health OK, /api/auth/login 401, built SPA assets served 200; backend 197 passed Build in EasyPanel container to verify nginx SPA-fallback + /api proxy + worker poll; choose broker (Redis vs durable-poll) + object storage for full readiness

Guardrails

  • No production implementation was changed during the architecture study.
  • Keep exactly three role identifiers: super_admin, admin, user.
  • Never expose LLM/API secrets to the browser or commit them to docs/logs.
  • Backend authorization and tenant scope are authoritative; frontend visibility is not security.
  • Do not claim LLM/Zep semantic parity without golden-fixture evidence.

Entry index

  • docs/engineering-log/2026-08-23-architecture-study.md
  • docs/test-evidence/2026-08-23-baseline.md
  • .hermes/plans/2026-08-23_110451-mirofish-saas-migration.md
  • docs/engineering-log/2026-08-24-simulation-memory-fallback.md
  • Independent SaaS audit findings were incorporated after the initial plan: raw log redaction, ID/path confinement, idempotency, upload drafts and API contract tests.
  • Safe-error audit now covers API response/persisted task state paths; raw exception/traceback values are replaced with generic localized errors and error-type-only server logs.
  • docs/engineering-log/2026-08-24-memory-parity-panorama-insight.md records the bounded parity implementation, verification evidence, review verdict, and remaining semantic/E2E boundary.
  • docs/engineering-log/2026-08-24-saas-foundation-verification.md