Elevate MiroFish/CrowdSight from single-container dev to a SaaS foundation: - Local memory backend (Zep-compatible): memory services/models, local graph builder + updater, AgentActivity seam, import-boundary isolation; Zep stays default, local is opt-in behind MEMORY_BACKEND. Semantic parity not yet proven. - Durable product persistence: projects/simulations/reports schema (migration 0007) + tenant/owner-scoped ProductRepository + dual-write + scoped_project read-first + ArtifactStore abstraction; durable JobQueue + worker.py. - SaaS hardening: durable RateLimiter (wired to login), UsageService (LLM accounting), redacted AuditService, idempotency, CORS allowlist, safe API errors, single-use PasswordResetService + endpoints (covers invite-pending). - Exactly 3 roles (super_admin/admin/user) with tenant authz policy. - Admin UI: GET/POST/PATCH /api/admin/users + GET/PUT /api/admin/settings (super-admin only, encrypted/masked); AdminView.vue + SettingsView.vue with admin/super-admin route guards, th/en i18n. - Production deploy topology: multi-stage Dockerfile (frontend build + gunicorn wsgi + nginx SPA-proxy + supervisord worker), backend/wsgi.py, gunicorn dep. Backend 197 passed; frontend 10 tests + build green. ruff unavailable (gap). No commit of credentials; secrets handled via env/.env.example. Deferred: Zep semantic A/B parity, object storage cutover, mobile QA, EasyPanel container build of deploy topology.
50 lines
1.7 KiB
Python
50 lines
1.7 KiB
Python
"""Durable rate limiting (sliding-window counter) over the rate_limit_events table.
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A durable counter table means limits survive worker restarts and multi-instance
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deploys. Keys are typically ``<operation>:<email-or-ip>``. No secrets are stored.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
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from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
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from ..models.rate_limit import RateLimitEvent
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def _utc_now() -> datetime:
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return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
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class RateLimiter:
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"""Flush-only rate limiter; caller owns the transaction boundary."""
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def __init__(self, session: Session, *, window: timedelta | None = None, limit: int | None = None):
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self.session = session
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self.window = window or timedelta(minutes=15)
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self.limit = limit or 60
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def check_and_record(self, operation: str, *, key: str, organization_id: str | None = None) -> bool:
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"""Record a hit if under the limit; return False when over the limit."""
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cutoff = _utc_now() - self.window
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count = self.session.query(RateLimitEvent).filter(
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RateLimitEvent.operation == operation,
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RateLimitEvent.key == key,
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RateLimitEvent.created_at >= cutoff,
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).count()
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if count >= self.limit:
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return False
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self.session.add(
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RateLimitEvent(
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operation=operation,
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key=key,
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organization_id=organization_id,
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)
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)
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# Rate-limit events are append-only side effects that must survive even
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# if the surrounding request transaction is later rolled back, so commit
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# them immediately.
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self.session.commit()
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return True
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