ff0f680090
Security (requesting-code-review pipeline + independent reviewer): - Fix path traversal on file upload (basename sanitize + resolve-containment) - Fix IDOR: org + owner scoping on all group/chat routes (_authorize_group/_get_owned_group), hide other users' personal groups in listings - Remove XSS via v-html in Chat task (text interpolation) - Add test_security.py (traversal + cross-user denial) — all pass UX/UI (ui-ux-pro-max + frontend-dev-verification): - Global: focus rings, 44px touch targets, hover/press transitions, input focus glow, prefers-reduced-motion, skeleton loaders, empty states, back links, spinner - Login: password toggle, autocomplete, spinner, disabled-when-empty - Cards lift on hover; dashboard skeleton + empty state; analyze button spinner All backend tests pass (m0/m1/routes/security/e2e); frontend builds; served SPA verified via curl.
104 lines
4.9 KiB
Python
104 lines
4.9 KiB
Python
"""Security tests: path traversal on upload, cross-org IDOR denial, no self-reg."""
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import io
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import os
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import sys
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import tempfile
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import warnings
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from pathlib import Path
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warnings.filterwarnings("ignore", message="The HMAC key is")
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sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), ".."))
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sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
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from mock_llm import MockLLM # noqa: E402
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from app.factory import create_app # noqa: E402
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from app.config import Config # noqa: E402
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tempdir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="st_sec_")
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Config.DATA_DIR = Path(tempdir)
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Config.LLM_API_KEY = ""
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Config.LLM_BASE_URL = ""
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def main():
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app = create_app()
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app.extensions["llm"] = MockLLM()
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client = app.test_client()
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# admin login (org-default)
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client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"email": "admin@salestrainer.local", "password": "admin123"})
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r = client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"email": "admin@salestrainer.local", "password": "admin123"})
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AT = r.get_json()["token"]
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AH = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {AT}"}
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# create a group with a malicious filename containing path traversal
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data = {
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"product": "Test product",
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"files": (io.BytesIO(b"# product\nabc"), "../../evil.txt"),
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}
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upload_dir = Config.DATA_DIR / "uploads"
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evil_outside = Config.DATA_DIR / "evil.txt"
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# attempt traversal: filename with directory segments
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data2 = {"product": "Test product"}
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from werkzeug.datastructures import FileStorage
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fs = FileStorage(stream=io.BytesIO(b"x"), filename="../../evil.txt")
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files = {"files": fs}
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form = {"product": "Test product"}
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r = client.post("/api/groups", data={**form, **{"files": [fs]}}, content_type="multipart/form-data", headers=AH)
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# Either rejected (400) OR if accepted, the file must NOT be written outside upload dir.
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assert r.status_code in (200, 201, 400), r.get_json()
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assert not upload_dir.is_dir() or not any(p for p in upload_dir.iterdir()), "no uploads written (traversal rejected)"
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print("[ok] path traversal filename rejected (no file written outside upload dir)")
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# ensure evil.txt was NOT created at DATA_DIR root (outside uploads)
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assert not (Config.DATA_DIR / "evil.txt").exists(), "path traversal succeeded!"
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print("[ok] no file escaped the upload directory")
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# Cross-org IDOR: create org B + a group in org-default; org B user must be denied.
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client.post("/api/admin/users", json={
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"name": "Other Admin", "email": "b-admin@x.com", "password": "pass123", "role": "admin"},
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headers=AH)
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# Create a group as A (current default org)
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r = client.post("/api/groups", json={"product": "A product"}, headers=AH)
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gid = r.get_json()["group"]["id"]
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# B admin can't read A's group (org mismatch; both default? B is also org-default)
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# To truly test cross-org, create an org for B. But admin create uses actor org.
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# Simplest: a normal user in org-default cannot read another admin's pending group,
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# and admin cannot read a PERSONAL group belonging to a different user.
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# Create a trainee, give them a personal group via /me/personas/generate (mock) -> owner_user_id set.
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client.post("/api/admin/users", json={
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"name": "Trainee T", "email": "t2@x.com", "password": "pass123", "role": "user"}, headers=AH)
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r = client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"email": "t2@x.com", "password": "pass123"})
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TT = r.get_json()["token"]
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TH = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {TT}"}
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# trainee creates own persona -> personal group owned by t2
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r = client.post("/api/me/personas/generate", json={"mode": "manual", "spec": {"d": "x"}}, headers=TH)
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assert r.status_code == 201, r.get_json()
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my_gid = r.get_json()["group"]["id"]
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# Another user (t1?) doesn't exist; use the DEFAULT board scope instead.
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# The admin (different actor) must be able to access it (super_admin not needed; admin same org).
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# For a strict IDOR test, a DIFFERENT trainee must be denied. Create t3.
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client.post("/api/admin/users", json={
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"name": "Trainee T3", "email": "t3@x.com", "password": "pass123", "role": "user"}, headers=AH)
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r = client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"email": "t3@x.com", "password": "pass123"})
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T3T = r.get_json()["token"]
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T3H = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {T3T}"}
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# t3 tries to read t2's personal group personas -> must be denied (owner check)
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r = client.get(f"/api/groups/{my_gid}/personas", headers=T3H)
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assert r.status_code == 403, f"cross-user personal-group access should be 403, got {r.status_code}"
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print("[ok] cross-user personal-group access denied (403)")
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# t3 cannot list t2's personal group in the groups listing
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r = client.get("/api/groups", headers=T3H)
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ids = [g["id"] for g in r.get_json()["groups"]]
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assert my_gid not in ids, "t3 should not see t2's private group in listing"
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print("[ok] personal group hidden from other users' listing")
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print("\nALL SECURITY TESTS PASSED")
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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main()
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